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THE ROLE OF ATTORNEY FEE SHIFTING
IN PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL* AND GEOFFREY P. MILLERt
I
INTRODUCTION
The most significant exception to the "American Rule" that civil litigants bear
their own attorney fees occurs in cases where a statute expressly authorizes a court
award of attorney fees.I More than 150 federal statutes now authorize attorney fee
shifting 2 and certain state statutes also authorize fee shifting.3 Most American fee
shifting statutes permit fee awards to successful plaintiffs in order to encourage
litigation deemed to be in the public interest. 4 Among the most important federal
fee shifting statutes are the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 19765 and
the Equal Access to Justice Act6 which permit attorney fees awards to prevailing
parties in broad classes of civil rights litigation and in litigation against the federal
government.7
As court awards of attorney fees to plaintiffs in civil rights, environmental, and
consumer cases became more frequent, proposals surfaced to place generic restric-
tions on attorney fees awards. The Reagan Administration and representatives of
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1. The history of the "American Rule" is outlined in detail in Justice White's majority opinion in
Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
2. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983). For a list of federal statutes authorizing
attorney fee awards, see ATr'Y FEE AWARDS REP., Apr. 1982, at 2. Most of the statutes authorizing fee
shifting were enacted after the Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421
U.S. 240 (1975). Many federal statutes, however, expressly authorized attorney fee awards at the time
Alyeska was decided. Id. at 260 n.33.
3. See, e.g., CALIF. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1982), which gives California courts authority to
award attorney fees in actions to enforce "important" rights in the public interest that confer a "significant
benefit" on "a large class of persons."
4. See Derfner, The True American Rule: Drajting Fee Legislation in the Pubh Interest, 2 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 251 (1979); R. LARSON, FEDERAL COURT AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS' FEES (1981).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1982).
7. The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act authorizes attorney fees awards to the prevailing
party in any action to enforce a provision of the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts, Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. See Derfner, The Clvd Rights
Attornes'Fees Awards Act of 1976, in PUBLIC INTEREST PRACTICE & FEE AWARDS (H. Newberg ed. 1980).
The Equal Access to Justice Act permits attorney fees awards against the United States to the same extent
as against any other party under the common law or any statute authorizing attorneys' fee awards and also
allows a fee recovery by prevailing parties meeting special eligibility requirements unless the government
can show that its position was substantially justified. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEPT. OF JUS-
TICE, AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND OTHER EXPENSES IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE EQUAL
ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT (1981).
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state and local governments, for example, have promoted legislation that would
severely limit recovery of attorney fees." While proponents of these proposed
restrictions maintain that they are necessary to correct abuses, virtually no data
supports their claim that excessive fees regularly are being awarded under existing
statutes. The real goal of the proposed restrictions is to discourage public interest
litigation by reducing both the likelihood of recovering attorney fees and the
amount of such recoveries.
This article considers proposals to restrict attorney fees awards in light of the
goals of fee shifting statutes and the role they play in public interest litigation.
The nature of public interest activity and the economic rationale for encouraging
it are discussed first. The role fee shifting statutes play in encouraging public
interest litigation is examined next. Details of the proposed restrictions on fee
awards are then outlined and discussed.
II
THE RATIONALE FOR ENCOURAGING PUBLIC INTEREST ACTIVITY
Before examining the role fee shifting statutes play in public interest litigation,
it is important to discuss what actions are considered "public interest activity" and
why society can benefit from encouraging such activity.
A. The Nature of Public Interest Activity
The term "public interest" is used in many different contexts to describe and
justify a wide variety of policies and activities. 9 While agreement is unlikely on a
single definition of public interest, inherent in the concept of public interest
activity is the notion of action benefitting a larger group than the individual or
group responsible for the activity.' 0 Activity primarily benefitting the individual
actor can be considered private interest activity, while activity producing wider
benefits is more likely to have a public interest character.
Because actions may benefit both the actor and a wider group, there is no
clear-cut dichotomy between "public interest" or "private interest" activities. In
his economic analysis of the public interest sector, Burton Weisbrod ranked the
8. The original Reagan Administration draft proposal was entitled The Limitation of Legal Fees Awards
Act of 1981 [hereinafter cited as the 1981 Reagan Proposal ]. It died without a sponsor. A new proposal,
styled the Legal Fees Reform Act [hereinafter cited as the 1983 Reagan Proposal], has been drafted by the
U.S. Department of Justice but has not been released publicly. For other proposals to restrict attorney fee
awards, see Attorneys' Fees Awards: Hearngs on S 585 before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Hearings] (Limitation onAwards of Attorneys'Fees
and Other Costs, amendment to S. 585 to be proposed by Senator Hatch); Id. at 91-101 (testimony of James
B. Brennan, National Institute of Municipal Law Officers). For further discussion of these proposals, see
infta notes 57-71 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Downs, The Pubhc Interest: Its Meaning in a Democracy, Soc. RESEARCH, Spring 1962, at 5; G.
SCHUBERT, THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1960); NoMos V: THE PUBLIC INTEREST (C. Friedrich ed. 1962).
10. See Weisbrod, Conceptual Perspective on the Pub/c Interest. An Economic Analysis, in PUBLIC INTEREST
LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 420 (B. Weisbrod ed. (1978)) [hereinafter cited as
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW], which defines "a public interest activity as one that, if it is successful, will bring
about significant external gross benefits to some persons; that is, the activity provides more complete repre-
sentation for some interest that is underrespresented in the sense that the interest has not been fully trans-
mitted through either the private market or governmental channels."
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public interest character of activities along a continuum based on the ratio of
expected external benefits (benefits enjoyed by parties other than the actor) to
expected total benefits (sum of external and internal benefits): t
- External + Internal Benefits
External Benefits
The greater the value of benefits accruing to persons outside the acting group
(external benefits) relative to benefits reaped by members of the group (internal
benefits), the greater is the public interest character of the activity in Weisbrod's
scheme.
B. Public Interest Activity as a Response to Market Failures
Economists have long recognized that a free market system is not likely to max-
imize economic welfare due to the existence of market imperfections such as exter-
nalities and the problem of producing collective goods. 12 Government
intervention in the marketplace may attempt to correct market imperfections;
however, government action alone cannot correct all market imperfections and in
some cases may actually exacerbate them. Public interest activity by nongovern-
mental actors may improve economic welfare by supplementing government
action to correct these market failures.
1. Private Market Imperfections. It is well-recognized by economists that under cer-
tain real world circumstances, the private market system cannot be expected to
produce an efficient allocation of resources. 13 The classic example of market
failure in the environmental area is the problem of externalities. Externalities
occur when the costs or benefits of one's actions are not fully internalized to the
actor, but rather are borne or are enjoyed by others. 14 For example, if a factory
pollutes the air or water to produce a product more cheaply, the price of the
product will not reflect its true social cost because part of the cost (the pollution)
will be borne by those who breathe the air or drink the water around the factory.
More goods and more pollution will be produced than is economically optimal in
the absence of action to internalize the cost of the pollution.
Another failure of private markets is the underproduction of goods whose bene-
fits inevitably are enjoyed by wide segments of society. 15 In the absence of collec-
tive action, private markets will not produce sufficient quantities of public goods,
such as national defense or police protection. Similarly, a competitive market
system will not necessarily allocate resources in an equitable manner. 16 Collective
action may be desirable to redistribute resources in a manner more equitable than
that produced by private markets.
2. Government Action. Government can play a major role in correcting imperfec-
11. Id. at 21.
12. See generally A. PIGou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920) (discussion of market imperfections).
13. See, e.g., Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 52 Q.J. ECON. (1958).
14. See A. PIGOU, supra note 12.
15. See Weisbrod, supra note 10, at 13-14.
16. Id at 16-17.
Page 233: Winter 19841
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS V
tions in private markets. Through the use of its taxing and spending powers and
its other regulatory authorities, government can purchase public goods, help inter-
nalize externalities, and redistribute resources in a more equitable manner than
the private market system.
Government action cannot, however, be expected to correct all market imper-
fections. 17 The one-person, one-vote model of a democratic system suggests that a
democratic government responds to somewhat different demands than a one-
dollar, one-vote market system. Yet, the influence of money in politics' 8 and the
varying degrees of organization and political influence possessed by various
interest groups imply that a democratic government will not always act to improve
economic welfare. Moreover, even after legislation designed to correct imperfec-
tions is enacted, it may not be administered or enforced in an optimal manner.
Enforcement resources are limited and may be subject to pressures not directed
toward maximizing economic and social welfare.
3. Pubh'c Interest Activity. Like government action, public interest activity by pri-
vate actors can improve economic and social welfare by correcting market imper-
fections. Because the private sector does not possess the regulatory authority
available to the government, its ability directly to correct market imperfections is
more limited. Thus, public interest activitity by private parties usually involves
efforts to stimulate or to supplement action by governmental bodies.
A wide variety of private actors and organizations engage in public interest
activity of the type outlined above. Although profit-making organizations can
engage in public interest activity, organizations primarily devoted to the public
interest are concentrated in the voluntary nonprofit sector. 19
Many kinds of actions may constitute public interest activity. Public interest
organizations litigate, lobby, participate in administrative proceedings, conduct
research, gather information, educate the public, and provide community serv-
ices.20 Each of these activities may be public interest activity to the extent that it
generates external benefits. While the focus of this article is on public interest
litigation and how it is affected by attorney fee shifting, it is important to
remember that public interest groups also engage in a variety of nonlitigation
activities to promote the public interest.
Because public interest activities by their very nature are directed toward pro-
ducing benefits that accrue to broad segments of the public, private individuals
have fewer incentives to spend their own time and money on such activities.
17. For an extended discussion of governmental failures to correct market imperfections, see id. at 30-
41.
18. See E. DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY (1983).
19. See Weisbrod, supra note 10, at 21.
20. In 1976, the National Inventory of Public Interest Law Programs, maintained by the Council for
Public Interest Law, listed 72 public interest law firms that employed a total of 478 lawyers and 384
nonlawyer professionals including researchers, writers, scientists, lobbyists, and administrators. Handler,
Ginsberg & Snow, The Pubhc Interest Law Industry, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 10, at 51. It esti-
mated that, when mixed private-public interest law firms and legal services backup centers were included,
there were a total of 166 firms in the public interest law industry, as well as 5,322 public interest nonlaw
organizations. Id at 76.
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Organizations have been formed that are devoted to public interest activity and
are funded by voluntary contributions. Government has recognized the benefits of
public interest activity by private organizations and has acted to encourage it in
certain respects. Organizations engaging in public interest activity have been
afforded tax-exempt status. 21 In recognition of the benefits of private litigation to
enforce statutory and constitutional rights, private rights of action have been cre-
ated by statute22 or judicial implication, 23 and fee shifting statutes have been
enacted to provide an incentive for successful public interest litigation.2 4 The role
that fee shifting statutes play in encouraging public interest litigation is explored
below.
III
THE ROLE OF FEE SHIFTING IN PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
While public interest litigation is funded by a variety of sources, transaction
costs and the diffuse nature of the benefits the litigation produces imply that insuf-
ficient resources will be devoted to such litigation in the absence of fee shifting.
Congress has enacted fee shifting statutes expressly to encourage public interest
litigation by removing some of the economic disincentives facing public interest
litigants. While attorney fee awards are an important mechanism for encouraging
public interest litigation, they continue to represent only a modest source of
funding for most public interest organizations.
A. Inadequacy of Economic Incentives
Most civil litigation is initiated by private parties who possess an interest in the
outcome of the litigation sufficient to make litigation worthwhile.25  Rational
plaintiffs would have to expect to receive legal or equitable relief of sufficient value
to compensate them for the expense and risk of litigation.
Private individuals have much weaker economic incentives for engaging in
public interest litigation. Because public interest litigation seeks to advance inter-
ests shared by broad segments of the public (e.g., environmental protection, civil
rights, consumer protection), the benefits of such litigation are widely scattered
21. Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code affords tax-exempt status to not-for-profit organi-
zations "operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educa-
tional purposes." Section 170(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code makes contributions to such
organizations tax deductible. For a discussion of tax considerations affecting public interest organizations,
see Post & Ravikoff, Orgamzational Support to Fund Environmental Litgation, 6 ENVIL. AFFAIRs 457 (1978).
22. See, e.g., Noise Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2619-2620 (1982); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 15 4 0 (g) (1982); Marine Protection Research & Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1976); Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 13 6 5(g), 1369 (1976); Deep Water Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1515-1516 (1976);
Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1978): Resource Conservation & Recovery
Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972, 6967 (1976); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604, 7607 (1976).
23. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fireman &
Engineman, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Texas & P. R. R. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
24. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
25. The law of standing requires that plantiffs have a sufficient interest to satisfy article III's "cases
and controversies" requirement, although this interest can be "aesthetic, conservational, and recreational
as well as economic .. " Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
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rather than concentrated in an individual party.2 6 Thus, the prospective benefit to
an individual party generally will not be sufficient to make it worthwhile for him
to bear the costs of public interest litigation. For this reason, public interest law is
often defined as involving efforts to provide legal representation to previously
underrepresented groups or interests. 27 While such a definition could also embrace
conventional private litigation undertaken on behalf of persons unable to afford
legal fees, the focus here is on litigation that ordinarily would not be undertaken
because it generates predominantly external benefits.
The formation of public interest groups funded by voluntary contributions is
one means for overcoming some of the disincentives facing the public interest liti-
gant. While voluntary contributions are the principal source of funding for public
interest litigation,28 they alone cannot produce an economically optimal level of
funding because of transaction costs and the inability of public interest groups to
collect from all beneficiaries of the litigation. Transaction costs include the often
significant expenses involved in identifying and contacting potential donors.29
These transaction costs and the problem of "free riders" (individual beneficiaries
26. The guidelines established by the Internal Revenue Service for affording § 501(c) (3) tax-exempt
status to public interest law firms require that
[t]he engagement of the organization in litigation can reasonably be said to be in representation of a
broad public interest rather than a private interest. The litigation is designed to present a position on
behalf of the public at large on matters of public interest. Typical of such litigation may be class
actions in the public interest, suits for injunction against action by government or private interest
broadly affecting the public, similar representation before administrative boards and agencies, test
suits where the private interest is small, and the like. The activity would not normally extend to direct
representation of litigants in actions between private persons where their financial interests at stake
would warrant representation from private legal sources.
Rev. Proc. 71-39, 1971-2 C.B. 575. Public interest law firms generally are barred from accepting fees for
their services by the IRS guidelines.
27. In 1976, the Council for Public Interest Law adopted the following definition:
Public interest law is the name that has recently been given to efforts to provide legal representation to
previously unrepresented groups and interests. Such efforts have been undertaken in recognition that
the ordinary marketplace for legal services fails to provide such services to significant segments of the
population and to significant interests. Such groups and interests include the poor, environmentalists,
consumers, social and ethnic minorities, and others.
COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 6-7 (1976).
A report on public interest law sponsored by the Ford Foundation in 1973 defined public interest law in
the following manner:
Public interest law is the representation of the underrepresented, and the line separating it from pov-
erty and civil rights law can best be defined historically. Broadened social concerns-as in the field of
consumer protection and environmental quality-along with a growing body of law expressing those
concerns, created new needs for legal actions and legal representation. Since such actions were by
definition for the benefit of large classes of people, individuals seldom could afford the cost.
G. HARRISON & S. JAFFE, THE PUBLIC INTEREST LAW FIRM: NEW VOICES FOR NEW CONSTITUENCIES 9
(1973).
28. A survey by the Council for Public Interest Law found that in 1975 public interest law organiza-
tions received a total of $34 million. Of this total, $14.5 million came from foundation grants, $8.6 million
from other contributions and grants, and $6.3 million from membership dues. Government provided $3.1
million in funds to public interest law organizations while court-awarded fees provided $600,000. Settle &
Weisbrod, Fnancing Pubhc Interest Law. An Evaluaton of Alternative Financing Arrangements, in PUBLIC
INTEREST LAW, supra note 10, at 534.
29. The fact that fund raising expenses may consume a large portion of the budgets of charitable
organizations is indicated by the Better Business Bureau's guideline that no more than 40% of an organiza-
tion's budget should be devoted to such expenses. BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU, PHILANTHROPIC ADVISORY
SERVICES, GIVE BUT GIVE WISELY (1983).
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of public interest litigation who enjoy its benefits regardless of whether they make
a contribution) ensure that voluntary contributions alone will be inadequate to
fund an efficient level of public interest litigation. 30
B. Fee Shifting as an Incentive to Public Interest Litigation
The importance of private rights of action as a means of implementing and
enforcing public policy has long been recognized in a wide variety of areas. 3'
Where the interests advanced by private litigation vindicate important public poli-
cies, Congress often authorizes attorney fee awards to remove some of the disincen-
tives for public interest litigation. Court awards of attorney fees to public interest
plaintiffs are designed to encourage public interest litigation, as Congress and the
courts repeatedly have reaffirmed.
For example, in the Civil Rights Act of 1964,32 Congress authorized a private
right of action to enjoin discrimination in public accommodations but recognized
that this would not be an effective enforcement mechanism in the absence of a
provision for attorney fee awards. As the Supreme Court explained in Newman v.
Pggi'e Park Enterprises:33
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that enforcement would prove
difficult and that the Nation would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means
of securing broad compliance with the law. A Title II suit is thus private in form only.
When a plaintiff brings an action under that Title, he cannot recover damages. If he
obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone, but also as a 'private attorney gen-
eral,' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority. If successful
plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys' fees, few aggrieved parties
would be in a position to advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of
the federal courts. Congress therefore enacted the provision for counsel fees . . . to
encourage individuals .. .to seek judicial relief under Title 1I.31
In Alyeska Pipehne Co. v. Wilderness Sociey 35 the Supreme Court majority opinion
acknowledged that by enacting fee shifting statutes, "Congress has opted to rely
heavily on private enforcement to implement public policy and to allow counsel
feels so as to encourage private litigation. ' 36 The Court, however, left it for Con-
gress to decide which public policies are important enough for their private
enforcement to be encouraged through authorization of fee shifting. 37
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Alyeska, proposed three criteria that could be
employed by courts in determining whether an award of attorney fees is appro-
priate in the absence of express statutory authorization:
The reasonable cost of the plaintiffs representation should be placed upon the defendant if
(1) the important right being protected is one actually or necessarily shared by the general
public or some class thereof; (2) the plaintiffs pecuniary interest in the outcome, if any,
would not normally justify incurring the cost of counsel; and (3) shifting that cost to the
30. See Weisbrod, supra note 10, at 26.
31. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1976).
33. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
34. Id. at 401-02.
35. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
36. Id at 263.
37. Id. at 264-65.
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defendant would effectively place it on a class that benefits from the litigation. 38
Under these criteria fee shifting would be permitted in virtually all public
interest litigation as defined in this article. Subsequent to 4Ayeska, Congress took
major steps in this direction by authorizing fee shifting in major classes of public
interest litigation.
Congress reaffirmed its belief in the importance of fee shifting to encourage
public interest litigation when it passed the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards
Act of 1976 in response to the Alyeska decision. The legislative history of the Act
clearly illustrates Congress' belief in the importance of private actions to achieve
effective enforcement of civil rights laws. The House committee report on the Act
notes that the authority and resources of federal agencies charged with civil rights
enforcement are limited and that effective enforcement "depends largely on the
efforts of private citizens." 39 The legislative history clearly reflects Congress' con-
cern that, in the absence of attorney fee awards, civil rights litigants would suffer
severe financial hardship that could deter private enforcement of these laws. Both
the Senate and House committee reports note the limited financial resources avail-
able to civil rights plaintiffs and the difficulty of obtaining effective representation
in the absence of a provision for attorney fee awards. 40
Most recently, in enacting the Equal Access to Justice Act, 4 1 Congress con-
cluded that it was difficult for private plaintiffs to challenge governmental action
"because of the expense involved in securing the vindication of their rights in civil
actions and administrative proceedings. '42 The purpose of authorizing fee shifting
under the Act is to diminish the "deterrent effect" of the expenses faced by parties
seeking to challenge government action.43 Attorney fee awards under the Act are
not limited to public interest litigants. They also are provided for individual or
corporate litigants seeking redress of private interests; however, the Act reflects
Congress' concern with increasing the access of parties who previously were under-
represented in the adversary process by denying fee awards to parties whose net
worth exceeds certain limits. 44
While Congress has established several different standards of eligibility for
attorney fee awards in the various statutes authorizing fee shifting, the most
common scheme is a modified one-way shifting in favor of successful plaintiffs. 4 5
Differences in fee shifting standards reflect, in part, congressional judgments about
the relative importance of encouraging private actions to enforce these statutes.
Some statutes authorize attorney fee awards to the "prevailing party," while other
38. Id. at 285-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
39. H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976).
40. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-6 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 39, at 1-4.
41. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1982).
42. See H.R. REP No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1980).
43. Id.
44. The Equal Access to Justice Act restricts eligibility for fee awards under its provisions to individ-
uals with a net worth less than $1,000,000 and corporations with a net worth less than $5,000,000. 5 U.S.C.
§ 504(b)(1)(B) (1982).
45. See Derfner, supra note 4, at 269. One exception is the fee shifting provision of the Norris
LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107(e) (1976), which permits fee awards only to successful defendants because
defendants are the party asserting the important federal rights under the Act.
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statutes, including the Freedom of Information Act, 4 6 permit awards to parties
who have "substantially prevailed." In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises4 7 the
Supreme Court held that the "prevailing party" standard in the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 created a presumption that successful plaintiffs "should ordinarily recover
an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award
unjust. '48  Recovery for prevailing defendants under this standard has been
restricted to cases of "frivolous, unreasonable or groundless" complaints in order
not to deter the good faith pursuit of ultimately unsuccessful civil rights actions. 49
Newman's "prevailing party" standard was adopted by Congress in the Civil
Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976.50 The Equal Access to Justice Act
employs a modified "prevailing party" standard permitting fee awards to parties
who prevail against the government, unless the court finds that the government's
position "was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award
unjust. '5 1
In general, fee shifting statutes provide an incentive only for meritorious litiga-
tion because attorney fee awards are authorized only for successful parties.
Although some statutes employ a seemingly more liberal standard, by authorizing
a court to award attorney fees whenever it determines that such an award is
"appropriate, '52 in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 53 the Supreme Court interpreted this
standard to require some measure of success on the merits before a party becomes
eligible for a fee award.
Despite differences in the standards employed in the various fee shifting stat-
utes, a reasonably consistent theme runs throughout. Congress generally author-
izes fee shifting where private actions serve to effectuate important public policy
objectives and where private plaintiffs cannot ordinarily be expected to bring such
actions on their own. Fee shifting is designed to remove some of the disincentives
facing public interest litigants, thus increasing access to the courts for groups who
otherwise might be unrepresented or underrepresented. Use of a modified one-
way fee shifting in favor of public interest litigants is expected to achieve these
goals. 54
46. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2)(B) (1982).
47. 390 U.S. 400 (per curiam 1968); see supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
48. 390 U.S. at 402.
49. Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
51. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1982).
52. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d) (1976); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(g)(4) (1982); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d) (Supp. IV 1980);
Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1427(c) (Supp. IV 1980); Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1976); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)( 4 ) (1976);
Deepwater Port Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1515(d) (1976); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300J(8)(d) (1976);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 304(d), 307(0 (1976); Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 491 l(d) (1976); Energy
Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6305(d) (1976); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, 42
U.S.C. § 8435(d) (Supp. IV 1980); Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9124(d) (Supp. IV
1980); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
53. 103 S. Ct. 3274, 3276 (1983).
54. See Rowe, Predicting the Efects of Attorney Fee Shifting, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at
139; Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial- A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal
Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 60-61 (1982).
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IV
PROPOSALS TO RESTRICT ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS
In recent years the Reagan Administration and representatives of state and
local governments proposed severe generic restrictions on attorney fees awards to
public interest litigants. 55 Proponents of these restrictions maintain that the
number and magnitude of attorney fees awards against governmental bodies has
been grossly excessive. These proposals are unsupported by data on experience
with existing fee shifting statutes, and they ignore the purpose of fee shifting stat-
utes and their impact on public interest litigation.
A. Proposed Restrictions on Fee Awards
In 1981, the Reagan Administration drafted proposed legislation designed to
place severe restrictions on eligibility for attorney fee awards.56 The proposed leg-
islation was designed to bar recovery of fee awards against the federal government
in most public interest litigation. Under the 1981 Reagan Administration pro-
posal, which would have been applied retroactively to all cases pending at the time
of its enactment, public interest organizations that employed staff attorneys in liti-
gation would be prohibited from receiving fee awards. 57 Fee awards could only be
made to private, paying clients in cases handled on a straight-fee basis.58 Thus,
fees could not be collected in cases handled by private attorneys representing indi-
gent clients or public interest organizations on apro bono basis. Fee awards would
not be permitted to any party represented by a legal services organization that
receives funds from the federal government. 59
Furthermore, the hourly rates for computing fee awards would have been sub-
ject to a cap set at the lower of the "actual direct cost" to the party or the highest
hourly rates payable to Civil Service attorneys (calculated as $53.16 per hour in
1982).6o Fee awards would have been permissible only for work performed on
issues on which a party actually prevailed and which was necessary for resolving
the controversy. 6I All fee awards in cases where a money judgment was obtained
would have been reduced by 25% of the judgment. 62 Fees for work performed in
litigating fee entitlement issues could be awarded against the government only if
the government was unreasonable in its position concerning fee issues.
63
The 1981 Reagan Administration proposal died without a sponsor. The
Administration, however, is now attempting to resuscitate it in modified form. In
55. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
56. The 1981 Reagan Proposal, supra note 8, drafted by the Office for Management and the Budget,
was designed expressly to reduce the amount of attorney fee awards against the federal government and to
reduce the federal civil case load. The proposal met such a firestorm of opposition that it never got beyond
draft form. The provisions discussed in the text are taken from the last draft of the 1981 Reagan Proposal.
A Bill to Providefor the Limitation on Legal Fees Awarded Against the United States (undated draft legislation).
57. 1981 Reagan Proposal, supra note 8, § 4(a)(3).
58. Id. § 4(a)(2).
59. Id. §7.
60. Id § 3(a).
61. Id §2.
62. Id §6.
63. Id. § 9.
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1983, the Administration drafted a new proposal which it may seek to introduce in
Congress in 1984. The 1983 draft legislation 64 is much broader in scope than the
1981 proposal because it would apply to fee awards against state and local govern-
mental entities as well as against the federal government. The 1983 proposal,
which also applies retroactively to all pending cases, does not contain a flat prohi-
bition on fee awards to public interest organizations using salaried staff attorneys,
groups represented bypro bono private counsel, or legal services organizations. It
would, however, impose a flat $75/hour cap on fee awards and permit courts to
reduce or deny fees that unreasonably exceed the hourly salary of the attorney
performing the work or "the monetary result achieved in the proceeding."6 5 The
automatic reduction in fees by 25% of any money judgment is retained in the 1983
draft,6 6 and no "multifliers" or "bonuses" could be permitted in fee computa-
tions. 67 Fees would only be permitted to parties who were "successful on signifi-
cant issues in the controversy" and who "obtained significant relief in connection
with these issues" 6 8-a standard stricter than that reflected in Hensley v. Eckerhart69
and Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club .70 Fee awards would not be permitted for work per-
formed subsequent to an unreasonably rejected settlement offer if the ultimate
relief obtained was not more favorable than the settlement offered. 71
Other proposed generic restrictions on fee awards include Senator Hatch's pro-
posals. These would limit the hourly rate used in computing fee awards to that
prevailing in the local market, bar the use of bonuses and multipliers in fee compu-
tations, and deny fees in cases that become moot due to a change in policy unless
the pendency of the litigation was the "preponderant reason" for the policy
change.7
2
The National Institute of Municipal Law Officers has proposed even more dra-
conian restrictions, including movement toward two-way fee shifting, a ban on fees
for work performed in litigating fee entitlement issues, and a requirment that an
organizational plaintiff demonstrate that it would not have brought the case but
for the availability of the fee award.73
64. In its most recent version, which has been drafted and endorsed by the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, the Reagan Administration Proposal is entitled the Legal Fees Reform Act. Although it has not yet been
released publicly, Justice Department officials have permitted one of the authors of this article to review
the draft legislation.
65. 1983 Reagan Proposal, supra note 8, § 5(a)(l).
66. Id. § 5(c)(1).
67. Id
68. Id. § 4.
69. 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1937 (1983). In Hensley v. Eckherhart, the Supreme Court held that a party may
be considered a prevailing party for purposes of a fee award if the party prevailed on "any significant
issue."
70. 103 S.Ct. 3274, 3276 (1983). In Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, the Court held that eligibility for
attorneys fees awards under the "where appropriate" standard required "some degree of success on the
merits."
71. 1983 Reagan Proposal, supra note 8, § 7(b).
72. See Hearings, supra note 8, at 12-13.
73. See id. at 91-101 (testimony of James B. Brennan, National Institute of Municipal Law Officers).
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B. Impact of Proposed Restrictions on Public Interest Litigation
The proposed restrictions on attorney fee awards would significantly reduce
the impact of fee shifting statutes in overcoming disincentives to public interest
litigation. The original Reagan Administration proposal would have defeated the
entire purpose of the fee shifting statutes by permitting fee shifting only to reim-
burse private litigants who already have resources and a private economic interest
in the litigation sufficient to justify hiring private attorneys. This would defeat the
very purpose of the fee shifting statutes, which are designed to encourage merito-
rious public interest litigation. Indeed, the 1981 Reagan Administration proposal
was designed expressly to discourage public interest litigation by reducing the
incentive effect of fee shifting statutes.7 4
The more recent proposals to restrict fee shifting attempt to justify such restric-
tions on the theory that fee awards are excessive and unreasonable. This hypoth-
esis is entirely unsupported by the data, and the proposals to correct this alleged
"abuse" discriminate against public interest litigants by treating them less favor-
ably than others entitled to fee awards. Courts generally have interpreted fee
shifting statutes as applying the same standard for public interest litigants as for
other private litigants. The virtually unanimous agreement of lower federal courts
that fee awards cannot be denied because of the public interest status of an
attorney or organization was confirmed by the Supreme Court in New York Gaslight
Club, Inc. v. Care 5.7 The Court relied in part on the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act, which indicated Congress' intent that public
interest attorneys be treated in the same manner as private counsel for purposes of
computing fees. 76
In Cope/and v. Marshall,7 7 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
adopted a "market value" approach to the computation of attorney fees, rejecting
arguments for a cost-plus-profit formula that would treat low-paid public interest
attorneys less generously than others. The court acknowledged that the market
value approach could provide a public interest firm with a recovery substantially
greater than its actual costs. But the court justified this result on the grounds that
it would help provide greater enforcement incentives and would avoid distorting
the settlement incentive faced by defendants. 78
The Copeland court also noted that it was easier to compute fees under the
market value approach than under the cost-plus method which requires more indi-
vidualized inquiries into actual litigation expenses. 79 Several other courts have
followed similar reasoning in rejecting attempts to restrict the amount of fees
74. Draft letter to accompany 1981 Reagan Proposal, supra note 8, at 4 ("by restricting attorneys fees,
the proposal will decrease Federal outlays and will help reduce the Federal Civil case load, which has
grown over 100% since 1975. ) (on file).
75. 447 U.S. 54 (1980).
76. Id at 70 n.9.
77. 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
78. Id at 899.
79. Id at 896.
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awarded public interest litigants.8 0 The Supreme Court is currently considering
whether the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act authorizes use of a multiplier
and whether a cost-plus method of computation that would compensate public
interest attorneys at hourly rates lower than that received by other practitioners
should be used. 8 1
Proposals imposing caps on hourly rates used in calculating fee awards, elimi-
nating the use of multipliers, and reducing fee awards to public interest groups
because of below-market salaries paid to their staff attorneys8 2 tend to defeat the
very purpose of fee shifting statutes-overcoming disincentives to public interest
litigation. Advocates of proposals prohibiting multipliers and imposing a fee cap
argue that such measures will only restrict fee awards to levels commensurate with
the salaries of government lawyers. This argument, however, ignores the fact that
government lawyers are paid whether or not they prevail and are compensated for
all their time, whether or not it is spent on activities for which attorney fees are
recoverable.8 3 Attorneys handling public interest cases bear the risk of ultimately
not prevailing in the litigation and thus not recovering fees. Moreover, interim
fees are rarely paid to public interest attorneys, who may have to wait years before
recovering any fees.8 4 A prohibition of multipliers reduces the incentive for public
interest litigants to bring the risky or complex cases which often produce the
greatest external benefits by developing new areas of law.
Proponents of restrictions on fee awards maintain that such prohibitions pro-
80. See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 616 F.2d 598 (lst Cir. 1980); Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163
(8th Cir. 1980); Serrano v. Unruh, 32 Cal. 3d 621, 652 P.2d 985, 186 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1982).
81. Blum v. Stenson, 512 F.Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y.),aft'd, 671 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1981), cerl. granted, 103
S.Ct. 2426 (1983).
82. A study comparing the earnings of public interest attorneys with those of their counterparts in
private law firms found that the earnings of public interest lawyers were only 59% as high as they would
have been in private practice. Komesar & Weisbrod, The Pubhc Interest Law Firm: A Behavioral Analsis, in
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 10, at 80, 82.
83. One element of the latest Reagan Administration proposal is a provision designed to win support
from lawyers compensated under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1)-3006A(d)(2), for han-
dling the defense of indigents in criminal cases. The proposal would double the maximum hourly rates
specified by statute for Criminal Justice Act cases from $30/hour to $60/hour for time spent in court and
from $20/hour to $40/hour for time spent out of court. Everyone agrees that the current ceilings set by the
Criminal Justice Act are horrendously out of date. This illustrates the dangers of fee caps that do not
adjust for inflation. Nonetheless the Administration is proposing to impose a flat $75/hour cap on all fee
awards, which would not permit adjustments for inflation, despite the fact that the Equal Access to Justice
Act's $75/hour cap permits such adjustments. Moreover, the Administration's justification for setting a
lower cap ($60/hour) on Criminal Justice Act fees than for all other fee awards ($75/hour) is that Criminal
Justice Act attorneys are compensated whether or not they are successful on the merits. 1983 Reagan
Proposal, supra note 8, § 5. This same rationale would justify fees for public interest litigants at rates that
are higher than that based on the salaries of government attorneys.
Using the Reagan Administration's assumption of overhead (three times take-home income) and 1,500
hours billing per year, a $75/hour cap would imply a maximum take-home pay of $37,500 for an attorney
who always prevails regardless of the attorney's experience, the complexity of the litigation, or market rates
in the community. This amount is less than the starting salary of recent law school graduates in some cities
and in many cases less than the rates paid by governmental bodies hiring outside counsel. See Letter from
the Alliance for Justice to Deputy Attorney General Edward C. Schmults (Sept. 28, 1983) (on file).
84. In practice, public interest attorneys often settle for fees at rates substantially below the market in
return for prompt payment without the need for litigation over fee recovery. Proposals to restrict "fees on
fees" (awards of attorney fees for time spent in litigation to recover fees) would be particularly damaging to
public interest litigants because of lengthy delays in fee recovery litigation and the federal government's
current practice of litigating virtually all fee requests.
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vide windfalls that unfairly subsidize public interest groups who pay low salaries to
their staff attorneys. It is rare, however, that public interest groups ever recover
their full litigation expenses from fee awards. Moreover, public interest lawyers
spend much of their time on activities that do not generate eligibility for fee
awards, such as participation in administrative proceedings prior to litigation.
Even in the rare instance in which a fee award to a public interest organization
exceeds the organization's actual litigation expenses, the award can only be used to
fund further public interest activity. 8 5 Therefore, rather than providing private
windfalls, fee awards at market rates simply permit public interest organizations to
provide greater services than awards computed on a cost-plus basis.
Arguments that fee awards are grossly excessive are oft-repeated but never sup-
ported by any systematic statistical data. Anecodotal data appear to be the exclu-
sive source for claims by the Reagan Administration that an entire "cottage
industry" has been created by attorney fee awards to public interest groups.8 6 In
fact, the federal government has not gathered any data indicating the total
amount of attorney fee awards paid by the government in any given year.
One of the few sources of statistical data on attorney fee awards paid by the
federal government is the annual report by the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts dealing with experience under the Equal Access to Justice Act. Although
government budget officials predicted that between 2,000 and 3,500 attorney fee
awards totalling $125-500 million would be awarded against the federal govern-
ment in the first full year of experience under this Act,87 in fact, only fifty-two
awards, worth a total of $1.7 million, were made. 88
Data from public interest organizations indicates that attorney fee awards
remain only a small percentage of the budget of most such groups. In 1976, a
survey of the nation's public interest organizations found that attorney fee awards
provided only 1% of the groups' total income between 1972 and 1975.89 While fee
awards have become more significant with the enactment of additional fee shifting
statutes in recent years, a 1983 survey of two dozen national public interest organi-
zations found that during the 1979-1983 period, 70% of the organizations received
less than 10% of their budgets in fee awards. 9° Fee awards were a more significant,
though still not predominant, share of the budget of the other organizations which
85. Internal Revenue Service regulations require a public interest organization to use court-awarded
fees "exclusively for the purpose of defraying its normal operating expenses." Rev. Proc. 75-13, § 3.04,
1975-1 C.B. 662. Staff attorneys for public interest organizations must be compensated "on a straight
salary basis, not exceeding reasonable salary levels and not established in reference to any fees recovered."
Id § 3.05. Thus, the argument that fee caps are necessary to prevent attorneys working for public interest
organizations from receiving greater compensation than government litigants is simply false.
86. The current draft Reagan Administration proposal includes a proposed finding that excessive fee
awards have been made in many instances and that the fee shifting statutes have "often operated to over-
subsidize attorneys at the expense of federal, state and local government taxpayers." 1983 Reagan Pro-
posal, supra note 8, § 2(a)(l).
87. See Awards of Attorneys' Fees Against the Federal Government. Hearngs before the House Judzag
, 
Comm.,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 474 (1980) (statement of Raymond S. Calamaro, Deputy Asst. Attorney General).
88. REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ON
REQUESTS FOR FEES AND EXPENSES UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1980, JULY 1, 1982,
THROUGH JUNE 30, 1983, -at 3-4 (1983).
89. COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 27, at D-10.
90. Alliance for Justice (unpublished survey findings) (1983).
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were active primarily in the civil rights area. Thus, court-awarded fees are a useful
supplement to the budgets of public interest groups, but not a massive subsidy of
their activities.
V
CONCLUSION
By authorizing fee shifting in favor of public interest litigants, Congress
intended to reduce economic disincentives discouraging public interest litigation in
order to further the enforcement of important public policies. The evidence does
not suggest that Congress went too far in removing disincentives facing public
interest litigants. The availability of fee awards encourages meritorious public
interest litigation that furthers private enforcement of important public policies.
Because the Reagan Administration's proposal severely curtailing fee awards to
public interest litigants does not suggest any alternative means for achieving the
Congressional purpose, it can only be motivated by the Administration's ideolog-
ical antipathy to public interest litigation rather than by a concern for designing a
more efficient means of providing equal access to justice.
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